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Post-founda+onal Ontology and the Charge of Social Weightlessness 
in Radical Democra+c Theory:  
A Response to Lois McNay’s The Misguided Search for the Poli4cal 
 
Tom N. Henderson 
Introduc+on 
Radical democracy has emerged over the last three decades as a loosely aﬃliated school of 
thought seeking to face new challenges that have arisen for poliOcal theory and pracOce since 
the ﬁnal years of the Cold War. While this period can be characterised as one of crisis for the 
Western academic and poliOcal lee – from the explanatory obsolescence of Marxist 
orthodoxy and the demise of Actually ExisOng Socialism, to the rise of non-class-based 
idenOty poliOcs – it has also led to a crisis for poliOcs more generally.  Rather than the end of 1
history, 1989 marked the ulOmate ascendency of neo-liberalism, an ostensibly universal 
consensual form of democracy based on market logic. Reducing all diﬀerences to immanently 
soluble technical problems, any antagonisOc concepOon of poliOcs, concerned with the 
interplay of power relaOonships, was declared irrelevant and unhelpful if peace and 
prosperity were to be pursued. Since then, peace and prosperity have proved elusive and 
inequitable, while antagonisms and stark power diﬀerenOals have only grown. The apoliOcal 
neo-liberal version of democracy serves to mask and sustain the inequaliOes it produces, even 
while unable to account for them, on grounds of economic necessity.  2
In response, radical democracy posits a resolutely poliOcal form of democracy that 
both accounts for power and antagonism, and seeks to unmask and criOque the injusOces of 
 Adrian Li9le and Moya Lloyd, ‘IntroducOon’, in	 The Poli7cs of Radical Democracy, ed. by Adrian Li9le and Moya Lloyd 1
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009), pp. 1-11.
 Lars Tønder and Lasse Thomassen, ‘IntroducOon: Rethinking Radical Democracy between Abundance and Lack’, in	Radical 2
Democracy: Poli7cs between Abundance and Lack, ed. by Lars Tønder and Lasse Thomassen (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 2005), pp. 1-13.
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neo-liberalism. Conceptually, this has involved a renewed focus on ‘the poliOcal,’ as not only 
autonomous from, but also primary to the social sphere, which includes ‘poliOcs’ in common-
sense terms. Such a move follows in the footsteps of, among others, Carl Schmi9, who 
reasserted the need to understand the poliOcal as poli7cal, against the depoliOcising forces of 
interwar German poliOcal liberalism.  By locaOng the poliOcal at, or as, the deepest level of 3
human being, this theoreOcal approach can rightly be labelled ‘poliOcal ontology.’ It is this 
focus on poliOcal ontology in radical democraOc theory that Lois McNay, in her book The 
Misguided Search for the Poli7cal: Social Weightlessness in Radical Democra7c Theory, 
accuses of counterproducOvely leading this school of thought away from the pracOcal 
challenges they are supposed to confront.  4
In what follows, I will argue, using Oliver Marchart’s understanding of ontology as 
‘poliOcal diﬀerence,’ that, while McNay’s concerns may be valid in reference to the parOcular 
radical democrats she has in her sights, poliOcal ontology per se is not necessarily the cause 
of the problem.  Moreover, I will suggest that the alternaOve she puts forward as the basis for 5
poliOcal theory, namely an embodied disclosing criOque of social suﬀering, could serve to 
supplement the least developed element of Marchart’s ontological approach: the mediaOon 
between the poliOcal and the social. I will argue that McNay’s overall argument need not be 
defended against, but can instead be put to work to enhance and reﬁne the poliOcal ontology 
of radical democracy in the name of its original purpose: to challenge, theoreOcally and 
pracOcally, apoliOcal neo-liberal forms of democracy and their consequences.  
 Carl Schmi9, The Concept of the Poli7cal, trans. by George Schwab (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996).3
 Lois McNay, The Misguided Search for the Poli7cal: Social Weightlessness in Radical Democra7c Theory (Cambridge: Polity 4
Press, 2014).
 For a discussion of the disOncOon between poliOcs and the poliOcal, see Oliver Marchart, Post-Founda7onal Poli7cal 5
Thought: Poli7cal Diﬀerence in Nancy, Lefort, Badiou and Laclau (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2008).
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McNay’s Argument 
McNay’s criOque of radical democracy is made on the basis that it has failed to live up to its 
own standards. For McNay, what makes radical democracy worth ﬁghOng for is its 
commitment to the criOque of power. ‘Radical democrats’, she observes, ‘maintain […] that 
thought about emancipatory norms cannot be disconnected from an account of exisOng 
social inequaliOes,’ thus locaOng the theorist as an acOve parOcipant in, rather than passive 
observer of, poliOcal struggle.  We will see that this is not always the case. 6
Her overall argument is as follows. Despite its purported concern for the criOque of 
power, radical democraOc theory has become divorced from the quoOdian experience of 
social life, and parOcularly of its negaOve and constraining features, which inhibit poliOcal 
acOon in pracOce. The excessively abstracOng tendency this ﬁeld of thought exhibits comes 
not from an avowed idealism of the sort embraced by analyOc philosophers like John Rawls, 
but from its over-reliance on an ontological concepOon of the poliOcal.  For McNay, this 7
entails the a9empt to disOl an essenOal understanding of the poliOcal from which to derive 
models of democracy. This in turn produces a theoreOcal hierarchy with the ontological (the 
poliOcal, in an abstract sense) at the top, and the onOc (the social, in a concrete sense) at the 
bo9om.  As a result, actual social power dynamics, being ﬁrmly onOc phenomena, are 8
disregarded. PoliOcal agency becomes understood no longer in terms of these dynamics, 
despite their instrumentality in inhibiOng or enabling it, but is simply equated with the 
abstract possibiliOes inherent in the indeterminacy of poliOcal ontology. This leaves no room 
for analysing how and why poliOcal acOon does or does not take place in a given situaOon, nor 
for accounts of the lived experience of those agents or would-be agents.  In the last instance, 9
 McNay, pp. 6-7.6
 Ibid., p. 11.7
 Ibid., p. 69.8
 Ibid., p. 15.9
3
the search for the poliOcal is misguided because there is no founda7onal essence of the 
poliOcal to be discovered.  10
McNay’s argument is made in reference to one set of radical democrats: Chantal 
Mouﬀe, Linda Zerilli and Wendy Brown, Jacques Rancière, and William Connolly and James 
Tully. Marchart, meanwhile, uses a diﬀerent but equally ontologically informed set – Jean-Luc 
Nancy, Claude Lefort, Ernesto Laclau, and Alain Badiou – to argue instead for a non-dualisOc, 
non-hierarchical understanding of the relaOonship between the onOc and the ontological, in 
which the social and the poliOcal are in fact shown to be mutually consOtuOve.  McNay does 11
cite this work in passing, but I will now argue that, in light of it, the social weightlessness of 
McNay’s thinkers stems not from the fact of their frameworks’ ontological character, but from 
their failure, in diﬀerent ways, to adequately account for the relaOonship between the social 
and the poliOcal, this relaOonship being a crucial element of Marchart’s argument. 
Being as Diﬀerence Versus Weak Aﬃrma+on 
The core of Marchart’s argument is his development of Heidegger’s ‘ontological diﬀerence’ 
into ‘poliOcal diﬀerence.’ As he explains, for Heidegger, the ontological — that which is 
supposed to serve in philosophy as the ulOmate, unchanging ground of Being — is in fact in a 
constant moOon of withdrawal, as a consequence of the historical weakening of the 
supposedly ﬁrm metaphysical foundaOons of modernity, such as History, Reason or Progress. 
This withdrawal produces an irreducible diﬀerence – the ontological diﬀerence – between the 
onOc, the realm of parOcular beings and phenomena, and the ontological ground upon which 
they try to stand. This diﬀerence itself becomes the only remaining ground to speak of, so 
Being must be conceived of as diﬀerence, rather than as ﬁrm foundaOon. For Marchart, this is 
the common ontological framework of his radical democrats’ concepOons of the poliOcal, 
 Ibid., p. 217.10
 See Marchart, Post-Founda7onal Poli7cal Thought. 11
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which serves as the conOngent, contestable or antagonisOc ground of poliOcs and the social. 
He therefore recasts the ‘ontological diﬀerence,’ between the ontological and the onOc, as 
the ‘poliOcal diﬀerence,’ between the poliOcal and poliOcs.  12
This diﬀers in two related ways from McNay’s understanding of poliOcal ontology. 
Firstly, she follows Tønder and Thomassen’s taxonomical disOncOon between poliOcal 
ontologies of lack or negaOvity, and those of abundance or posiOvity.  Further, she follows 13
White in understanding any a9achment to these ontologies, parOcularly posiOve ones, as 
tempered by a ‘weakness’ that guards against their being mistaken for solid ground.  For 14
McNay, this is what leads to social weightlessness, or at least a lack of poliOcally commi9ed 
social criOque, in Connolly’s work. While his posiOve ontology should incorporate an 
immanent, materialist analysis of individuals’ lived pracOces, to prevent the reiﬁcaOon of such 
analysis into irrefutable ground – enter here White’s ﬁgure of weakness – Connolly calls for an 
‘ethos of generosity,’ an acknowledgement of the contestability of one’s views. McNay rightly 
idenOﬁes the inherent conservaOsm of such an ethos, meekly aﬃrmaOve of the status quo 
and necessarily averse to arguing for an alternaOve.  15
But such depoliOcised quieOsm is not the inevitable consequence of understanding 
the poliOcal ontologically: the ‘ethos of generosity’ is necessary only to prevent the slip from 
an ontology of abundance into one of solid foundaOon. McNay does acknowledge this, and 
Dean, who rejects White’s weakness thesis, but upon whose argument McNay here partly 
relies, sees how an aﬃrmaOve ontology such as Connolly’s could sOll ‘inspire a poliOcal drive 
to struggle for change.’  The fact that it does not stems from its straighsorward posiOvity and 16
the subsequent a9empt to prevent its condensaOon into naturalisOc foundaOonalism. An 
 Ibid., Post-Founda7onal Poli7cal Thought, pp. 18-25.12
 McNay, p. 172.13
 Stephen K. White, Sustaining Aﬃrma7on: The Strengths of Weak Ontology in Poli7cal Theory (Princeton: Princeton 14
University Press, 2000), pp. 6-8.
 McNay, pp. 174-178.15
 Ibid., p. 180; Jodi Dean, ‘The Politics of Avoidance: The Limits of Weak Ontology’, The Hedgehog Review, 7.2 (2005), 55-65 (p. 58).16
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equivalent risk presents itself in ontologies of lack, which may, if unchecked, lead to the 
valorisaOon of death and destrucOon.  An ontology of diﬀerence, however, while not 17
immune from being hypostaOsed into, for instance, a poliOcs of separaOsm, has the 
advantage that conOngency and contestability are built into its fundamental premises, 
avoiding the need to introduce the poliOcally deadening factor of weakness a posteriori.  18
This lends it greater potenOal to be wielded for more criOcal purposes. 
The Poli+cal as Universal Essence? 
The second problem McNay idenOﬁes in ontological radical democraOc thought is its posiOng 
of the poliOcal as an essenOalised, ahistorical concept transcending social actuality. She cites, 
for example, Mouﬀe’s idea of the inherence and universality of antagonism.  Whether or not 19
Mouﬀe can be said to make this claim, an ontology of poliOcal diﬀerence would not allow for 
such a move. Firstly, being post-foundaOonal, rather than foundaOonal or anO-foundaOonal, it 
is not an ahistorical ontology.  That is not to imply that it denotes a sequenOal move from 20
one discrete era to another. Rather, as both Laclau and Vavmo each argue in their 
Heideggerian ontologies, the withdrawal of foundaOons is a moment both internal to 
modernity – they were never solid in the ﬁrst place – and consOtuOve of what could in the 
loosest sense be called post-modernity, as human beings struggle to come to terms with this 
realisaOon.  That is to say, the poliOcal diﬀerence is temporally speciﬁc. 21
 Secondly, its emergence in Ome is also an emergence in space. One of the sets of 
historical events in which the poliOcal diﬀerence began to disclose itself is, for Marchart, 
 Oliver Marchart, ‘The Absence at the Heart of Presence: Radical Democracy and the “Ontology of Lack”’, in Radical 17
Democracy: Poli7cs between Abundance and Lack, ed. by Lars Tønder and Lasse Thomassen (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 2005), pp. 17-31 (p. 28).
 Ibid.18
 McNay, p. 70.19
 Marchart, Post-Founda7onal Poli7cal Thought, pp. 12-13.20
 Ernesto Laclau, Emancipa7on(s) (London: Verso, 2007), pp. 101-103; Marchart, Post-Founda7onal Poli7cal Thought, p. 26; 21
Gianni Vavmo, Nihilism and Emancipa7on: Ethics, Poli7cs, and Law, ed. by SanOago Zabala, trans. by William McCuaig (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2004), p. 50.
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following Lefort, the European democraOc revoluOons, symbolised by the decapitaOon of 
Louis XVI of France. This placed contestability and conOngency, not divinely sancOoned 
monarchical authority, at the heart of poliOcal organisaOon.  For European poliOcs aeer 22
these events:  
 
every regime – democraOc or not – [has] to come to terms with the absence of 
an ulOmate ground and with the unbridgeable chasm of division that opens up 
in place of [any prior] ground.   23
But in no way does this make any claims about the inherent poliOcal character of all human 
existence always and everywhere. The de facto universality of European democracy, which is 
now the model for almost all forms of state poliOcal organisaOon, is wholly conOngent and 
historically insOtuted. 
 Indeed, only from this conOngency can Marchart move from the language of Being in 
general (of which we can no longer speak, as such) to that of the poli7cal. What the poliOcal 
diﬀerence introduces is the possibility (although not the guarantee) that society could be 
organised democraOcally; our present experience of Being (as diﬀerence), in our parOcular 
Ome and place, can be understood as that of the poliOcal.  This quasi-transcendental 24
posiOng of poliOcal ontology as fundamental ontology is not the kind of metaphysical 
sophistry that McNay rightly denounces; rather than a statement about the essen7al 
character of the poliOcal (this, indeed, does not exist) it is one about the latently poliOcal, that 
is, conOngent, contestable, antagonisOc, groundless/self-founding character of anything that 
today can be understood in terms of Being. To speak of ‘the poliOcal’ in ontological terms is to 
recast Being as diﬀerence, and to idenOfy this diﬀerence with the poliOcal.  25
 Marchart, Post-Founda7onal Poli7cal Thought, p. 93.22
 Ibid., Post-Founda7onal Poli7cal Thought, pp. 95-96.23
 Ibid., Post-Founda7onal Poli7cal Thought, pp. 165-172.24
 Ibid., Post-Founda7onal Poli7cal Thought, p. 172.25
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The Mutual Cons+tu+on of The Poli+cal and The Social 
Understood as the poliOcal, Being not only provides the groundless ground of the social, but 
is itself consOtuted by actual onOc events, both historically and presently. The relaOonship 
between the poliOcal and the social, where these events occur, must therefore be understood 
as mutually consOtuOve, not hierarchical. Indeed, it is precisely because it is impossible to 
construct a pure general ontology untainted by the onOc that a regional ontology, 
contaminated by the onOc, can and must ascend to the place of a general ontology. For 
Marchart this itself is a poliOcal decision, ‘an intervenOon from the onOc side of poliOcs [that 
is, the social] into the depoliOcized ﬁeld of philosophy.’  26
 McNay, who does acknowledge this step of Marchart’s argument, is therefore right to 
be concerned when she observes cases, speciﬁcally those of Mouﬀe and Rancière, where the 
social becomes bracketed, and, once a saOsfactory abstract understanding of the poliOcal has 
been obtained, these brackets become permanent, lest their contents contaminate it.  It is 27
not that these thinkers do not appreciate the importance of connecOng their understandings 
of the poliOcal to social pracOce; indeed, Rancière shuns, or at least disavows, the framework 
of ontology, in favour of a more socially consOtuted poliOcal theory. But by subordinaOng the 
experience of the social to their rigid, anO-sociological deﬁniOons of the poliOcal, both Mouﬀe 
and Rancière become unable to engage with it.  Suﬃce it to say that this parOcular path to 28
social weightlessness is anything but a necessary consequence of theorising the poliOcal 
ontologically. To ignore the social and its relaOonship to the poliOcal, as do Mouﬀe and 
Rancière, is surely to empty the la9er category of any weight too. 
 Ibid., Post-Founda7onal Poli7cal Thought, p. 171.26
 McNay, p. 95, p. 215.27
 Ibid., p. 148.28
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Indeterminacy and Agency 
The ﬁnal accusaOon McNay makes of ontological radical democraOc theory is its equaOon of 
indeterminacy with agency. Here, she observes, it is assumed that once the ulOmate 
indeterminacy at the heart of (poliOcal) Being has been recognised, anyone should now be 
free to exercise their poliOcal agency unfe9ered. There are obvious problems with this; 
McNay cites Bourdieu’s concern with the, oeen internalised, obstacles prevenOng people 
from acOng in their own interests, and registers surprise ‘that radical democrats do not a9end 
more closely to the depoliOcizing eﬀects of symbolic violence and instead take poliOcal 
agency as an unproblemaOc given.’  As Hoy succinctly puts it, in light of the inﬁnite 29
indeterminacy of being, ‘[t]he task then becomes to explain why a thousand possibiliOes are 
not simply actualized, and why instead socieOes manage to be fairly stable.’  30
 This task is avoided for various reasons by the theorists McNay cites: for Mouﬀe’s 
theory, cut oﬀ from social reality, it is convenient to assume that social agents will simply 
proceed according to the logic of the poliOcal; for Rancière, his underlying presumpOon of 
equality elides with an unspoken presumpOon of agency, failing to consider that ‘agency is 
not a capacity that is evenly distributed across all subordinated groups,’ and that ‘the poor’ 
cannot always ‘speak and act on their own behalf.’  Meanwhile, for post-idenOty feminists 31
Brown and Zerilli, the anO-subjecOvist impulse to leave behind the fragmenOng parochial 
concerns of idenOty, which obsess over trauma and vicOmhood, in favour of broader poliOcal 
aims, simultaneously leaves behind any account of suﬀering that may shed light on pracOcal 
obstacles to agency. Instead they se9le with an abstract noOon of agency stemming from the 
same celebrated indeterminacy that deconstructs idenOty claims.  32
 Ibid., p. 162, p. 208.29
 David Couzens Hoy, Cri7cal Resistance: From Poststructuralism to Post-Cri7que (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2004), p. 15.30
 McNay, p. 85, pp. 162-163. 31
 Ibid., pp. 100-103, p. 115.32
9
 Once again, in none of these cases is social weightlessness a necessary or direct 
consequence of the fact that these thinkers adopt ontological frameworks; it goes against the 
crucial mutually consOtuOve relaOonship between the social and the poliOcal. Indeed, for 
Marchart, echoing Laclau’s navigaOon between voluntarism and determinism, this is crucial 
for post-foundaOonalism: whilst ‘[a]t no point do we encounter a solid anchorage for our 
acOviOes, […] no voluntarism follows from this, as we never sail on a sea without waves.’  33
Nonetheless, neither provides a saOsfactory account of these impeding waves, aside from 
some vague references to phenomenological sedimentaOon, leaving this corner of their 
theories unfurnished. It is precisely out of McNay’s proposed remedy to social 
weightlessness, to which I will now turn, that a possible way of understanding this social-
poliOcal relaOonship emerges.  34
Interpreta+on, Embodiment and the Cri+que of Social Suﬀering 
The approach McNay proposes as the basis of a poliOcally commi9ed radical democracy 
combines Bourdieu’s criOque of social suﬀering with Honneth’s version of disclosing criOque. 
Brieﬂy, building on his more well-known idea of social habitus, Bourdieu’s criOque aims to 
‘[render] visible those oppressions and injusOces that remain below the threshold of public 
percepOon’ as a result of symbolic violence that both oppresses and silences social actors.  35
Honneth, meanwhile, integrates this de-essenOalised understanding of suﬀering into a 
disclosing social criOque of the sort the original criOcal theorists of the Frankfurt School set 
 David Howarth, ‘Hegemony, PoliOcal SubjecOvity, and Radical Democracy’, in Laclau: A Cri7cal Reader, ed. by Simon 33
Critchley and Oliver Marchart (London: Routledge, 2004), pp. 256-76 (p. 264); Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouﬀe, Hegemony 
and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democra7c Poli7cs, 2nd edn (London: Verso, 2001), p. 112; Marchart, Post-
Founda7onal Poli7cal Thought, pp. 3-4.
 See above, and Oliver Marchart, ‘InsOtuOon and DislocaOon: Philosophical Roots of Laclau’s Discourse Theory of Space and 34
Antagonism’, Dis7nk7on: Scandinavian Journal of Social Theory, 15.3 (2014), 271-82 <h9ps://doi.org/10.1080/1600910X.
2014.966272> [accessed 12 July 2016] (p. 275).
 McNay, p. 43.35
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out to undertake.  For McNay, by deriving ‘emancipatory norms’ from social pracOces rather 36
than abstract logic, a: 
 
phenomenology of suﬀering signiﬁcantly expands a mainstream account of 
social jusOce by uncovering neglected types of social misery that arise from 
normalized structural inequaliOes.  37
An obvious criOcism of this approach, to which Bourdieu was no stranger, is that it promotes a 
paralysing miserabilism, oﬀering no hope of poliOcal emancipaOon. Against this, McNay 
argues that it provides a necessary foil to the all-too-easy romanOcisaOon of subaltern agency 
and challenges the feOshisaOon of indeterminacy ‘as an apodicOc source of radical 
poliOc[s].’  In sum, it casts into relief:  38
 
disconOnuity between […] the abstract negaOvity of non-idenOty […] that 
informs ideas of progressive ethical pracOce and […] the social negaOvity of 
non-idenOty as experiences of isolaOon, resignaOon and disempowerment.   39
Suﬀering, then, is not to be understood moralisOcally or in generalised existenOal terms, but 
rather as ‘a poliOcal category, where certain generic types of social suﬀering are [seen as] the 
outcome of asymmetrical relaOons of power.’  Moreover, as a phenomenological approach, it 40
is the experience of suﬀering that is the concern here: embodied social pracOces, not just 
ideas about them.  41
 A second, subtler criOcism is that, as a phenomenology, this approach is so 
immanenOst that it risks succumbing to the exact opposite of social weightlessness, reducing 
poliOcal criOque to immediate, parOcular subjecOvity. This would sacriﬁce the poliOcal in 
favour of the social, rather than mediaOng between the two. While not addressing this 
 Ibid., p. 47, p. 209.36
 Ibid., pp. 47-48.37
 Ibid., p. 54, p. 93.38
 Ibid., p. 111.39
 Ibid., p. 210.40
 Ibid., p. 208, p. 216.41
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directly, McNay does inadvertently indicate one soluOon by framing her approach in terms 
not only phenomenological but hermeneuOcal. She does so on the basis that hermeneuOcs 
bypasses debates concerning idealism and realism, since it ‘stresses the ineluctably situated 
[non-ideal] nature of normaOve judgements’ while also recognizing that ‘the world is always 
already pre-interpreted; there is no neutral, value-free standpoint on social “reality.”’  42
 This harks back to Heidegger’s ontology, in which, since ‘there is nothing to Being 
itself,’ hermeneuOcs is the only adequate form of ontological thinking, an acOvity that consists 
in the interpretaOon of, and within, the ‘thrown’ context of human being (Dasein).  43
Honneth’s ﬁgure of disclosure ﬁnds its roots here too, as interpretaOon is precisely the 
disclosure of the groundless truth of Being.  Indeed, McNay’s hermeneuOcs resembles what 44
Vavmo calls an ‘ontology of actuality,’ a way to apprehend Being that takes its ‘summons […] 
from the world, never from a moOvaOon internal to the logic of […] philosophical discourse.’  45
While for Vavmo an ontology of actuality oﬀers an interpretaOon ‘of the ongoing historical 
process and […] of its posiOve potenOal,’ it could equally include the nega7ve stulOfying 
aspects of social actuality that inhibit the realisaOon of poliOcal potenOal, as per Bourdieu’s 
criOque of social suﬀering.  46
McNay’s is not a convenOonal hermeneuOcs, however. For Heidegger, the birth of the 
discipline proper involved its departure from phenomenology, making the former a purely 
textual acOvity, empOed of bodies, materiality, and experience.  Although Vavmo is 47
concerned in recent work with the interpretaOve potenOal of weak and marginalised 
 Ibid., p. 210.42
 MarOn Heidegger, cited in Vavmo, Nihilism and Emancipa7on, p. 95; Gianni Vavmo and SanOago Zabala, Hermeneu7c 43
Communism: From Heidegger to Marx (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), p. 87, pp. 92-93; see Howarth, p. 268 on 
the relaOonship between thrownness and Laclau’s noOon of dislocaOon.
 Vavmo and Zabala, p. 22.44
 Gianni Vattimo, Farewell to Truth, trans. by William McCuaig (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), p. 24.45
 Vavmo, Nihilism and Emancipa7on, p. 88.46
 Richard Kearney, ‘The Wager of Carnal HermeneuOcs’, in Carnal Hermeneu7cs, ed. by Richard Kearney and Brian Treanor 47
(New York: Fordham University Press, 2015), pp. 15-56 (pp. 16-17).
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populaOons, material experience remains conspicuously absent.  But by founding her 48
hermeneuOcs on interpretaOons of embodied suﬀering, McNay reunites the two disciplines, 
in a move close to Richard Kearney’s recent formulaOon of ‘carnal hermeneuOcs,’ following 
Irigaray and the later Ricoeur’s return to the ﬂesh. Put succinctly, this involves the relocaOon 
of the sensate body as the primary site of hermeneuOcs, while sOll retaining the mediaOng 
funcOon of Heidegger’s hermeneuOcs between Being and beings, which is missing from 
phenomenology.  49
 Inadvertently then, the approach that McNay proposes, if understood in terms of 
Vavmo’s ontology of actuality and Kearney’s carnal hermeneuOcs, could not be more apt a 
framework for understanding the mutual consOtuOon of the social and the poliOcal, providing 
the missing piece of Marchart’s poliOcal ontology. 
Conclusion 
I have argued that McNay’s book does not so much make the case for the abandonment of 
the ontological approach to the poliOcal, as for it to be more ﬁnely honed and developed as a 
criOcal tool for poliOcal theory and pracOce. Overall, her argument is clearly useful in the 
criOque of the speciﬁc authors she targets, but the standards against which she holds them 
can in fact be best met via a properly post-foundaOonal poliOcal ontology. In terms of the 
general status of the ontological, the way in which this is translated into the concept of the 
poliOcal, and the quesOon of universality versus temporal and spaOal speciﬁcity, Marchart’s 
noOon of the poliOcal diﬀerence has been found to overcome most of the problems McNay 
idenOﬁes in her authors, showing that it is not the ontological approach per se that is the 
problem, so much as the way in which their parOcular approaches construe the relaOonship 
 See Vavmo and Zabala.48
 Kearney, ‘The Wager of Carnal HermeneuOcs’, p. 54; See also, Richard Kearney, ‘What Is DiacriOcal HermeneuOcs?’, Journal 49
of Applied Hermeneu7cs, 1.1 (2011), 1-14 <h9p://jah.journalhosOng.ucalgary.ca/jah/index.php/jah/arOcle/view/6> [accessed 
12 July 2016].
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between the poliOcal and the social. When it comes to the problem of equaOng agency with 
indeterminacy, while again not found to be a necessary consequence of an approach such as 
Marchart’s, McNay’s criOque does reveal a conspicuous thinness on this topic. The soluOon 
she proposes, of an interpretaOve, embodied disclosing criOque of social suﬀering, was found 
not only to operate within the same broadly Heideggerian framework as Marchart and 
related thinkers, but moreover to supplement their thought by reintroducing the 
hermeneuOc dimension of Heidegger’s ontology, and furthermore, reintroducing the body to 
hermeneuOcs. 
 McNay’s contribuOon to the ontological thinking of the poliOcal in radical democraOc 
thought should not be understated. While this appears to go directly against the intenOons of 
her book, it must be acknowledged that she is not opposed to the overall endeavour of 
radical democracy, nor its transcendental turn as such.  Perhaps the greatest achievement of 50
her argument is to help radical democracy live up to its own standards. Meanwhile, I have not 
a9empted to deny the existence of the problem of social weightlessness; McNay idenOﬁes 
very real and concerning tendencies within the ﬁeld of radical democracy. The way forward, 
then, must not be to abandon the ontological framework, nor to remain unaware of the 
dangers of over-abstracOon and the detachment of theory from pracOce. The primary task of 
poliOcal theory can sOll be the search for the poliOcal, but this search must begin with the 
embodied experience of actual social beings. 
 McNay, p. 4.50
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